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In the literature, several models for group decision making based on the additive aggregation of group 
members’ utility or value functions have been proposed (Keeney and Kirkwood 1975; Dyer and Sarin 1979; 
Keeney and Nau 2011). These group aggregation rules usually are based on systems of axioms very similar 
to those formulated by Arrow (1963) for the case of aggregating ordinal preferences. In contrast to 
aggregation of ordinal preferences, aggregation of cardinal alues is thus possible in groups. However, it 
requires group members to specify their preferences in cardinal form, by assigning utility scores to 
alternatives. This could be difficult for group members, in particular if this information should be provided 
exactly.  
Methods for decision making under incomplete information, which have already been suggested in the 
context of negotiation problems (Sarabando, Dias et al. 2012), could be employed to simplify this task for 
group members. They would actually allow information to be specified also only in ordinal form (i.e. as a 
ranking of alternatives), although this information could then be used to approximate a cardinal utility 
function. This concept can be applied at various levels along the spectrum between purely cardinal and 
purely ordinal information, for example, group members could also specify preference information not only 
as a ranking of alternatives, but also as a ranking of differences of alternatives, which would be one step 
closer to cardinal information. While it is obvious that providing information closer to exact cardinal utility 
values will increase the precision of preference statements at the group level, the  strength of this effect is 
not clear. 
Uncertainty about parameters of preference functions does not only concern the individual member’s 
preference function. At the group aggregation level, weights of group members can also be considered as 
uncertain parameters. In a recent paper, Dias and Sarabando (2012) extended Arrow’s non-dictatorship 
condition to the aggregation of cardinal preferences and showed that it can be represented as a constraint 
on weights of group member in an additive group utility function 
In this paper, we report on a comprehensive computational study, in which we attempted to quantify the 
effect of providing different levels of preference information (exact cardinal values, rankings of differences 
between alternatives and rankings of alternatives), and of the imposition of different constraints on 
members’ weights in an additive group utility function (equal weights, general random weights and random 
weights satisfying the Non-dictatorship condition) on outcomes at the group level. Relevant outcome 
dimensions analyzed refer to the structure of the group preference relation, building on concepts like 
necessary and possible relations as established in decision making under incomplete information (Dias and 
Clímaco 2002; Greco, Mousseau et al. 2008); as well as robustness of results, and the strength of impact of 
individual group members. 
References 
Arrow, K. J. (1963). Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
Dias, L. C. and J. Clímaco (2002). Exploring the Consequences of Imprecise Information in Choice Problems Using 
ELECTRE. Aiding Decisions with Multiple Criteria - Essays in Honor of Bernard Roy. D. Bouyssou, E. Jacquet-
Lagrèze, P. Pernyet al. Amsterdam, Kluwer: 175-193. 
Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2013  17-21 June 2013, Stockholm, Sweden 
249 
Dias, L. C. and P. Sarabando (2012). "A Note on a Group Preference Axiomatization with Cardinal Utility." 
Decision Analysis 9(3): 231–237. 
Dyer, J. S. and R. K. Sarin (1979). "Group Preference Aggregation Rules Based on Strength of Preference." 
Management Science 25: 822-832. 
Greco, S., V. Mousseau and R. Slowinski (2008). "Ordinal regression revisited: Multiple criteria ranking using a set of 
additive value functions." European Journal  of Operational Research 191(2): 416–436. 
Keeney, R. L. and C. W. Kirkwood (1975). "Group Decision Making Using Cardinal Social Welfare Functions." 
Management Science 22: 430-437. 
Keeney, R. L. and R. Nau (2011). "A theorem for Bayesian group decisions." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 43: 1–
17. 
Sarabando, P., L. C. Dias and R. Vetschera (2012). "Mediation with Incomplete Information: Approaches to Suggest 
Potential Agreements." Group Decision and Negotiation in print, DOI 10.1007/s10726-012-9283-9. 
